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Not a Single Point of View: Contemporary Sculpture and the Spatial Imaginary

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You never look at me from the place from which I see you. Conversely, *what I look at is never what I wish to see.*
—Jacques Lacan[1]

In a 1996 essay pointedly titled "Boys Town," the feminist art historian and urban theorist Rosalyn Deutsche takes geographer David Harvey to task for what she considers to be his unflagging faith in "general"—which is to say *all-encompassing*—theories of contemporary culture.[2] More specifically, Deutsche levies the claim that Harvey's own portrayal of society—employing a spatial paradigm that privileges an examination of socioeconomic conditions under capitalism—is similar to so many other totalizing analytical models insofar as he necessarily eliminates any acknowledgment of *difference* with regard to subjectivity.[3] Indeed, Deutsche suggests not only that a consideration of difference is omitted here but also that Harvey's larger "account of postmodernism *depends* on feminism's absence" and that his "vision of the city" (both literally and figuratively) must disavow the possibility of multiple views and insist instead on a kind of singular, *unmarked,* God's-eye perspective in order to maintain coherence.[4] (Harvey advocates for a holistic gaze that he designates "voyeuristic," never acknowledging the sexual or predatory nature of the term. Deutsche, countering, proposes the possibility of the "narcissistic" in vision, arguing that, pace Laura Mulvey, such a mode would enable a viewer not only to create "idealized reflections of the self in the world" but also to imagine modes of "intersubjective relation.")[5] Though it may be argued that Harvey's position is less overarching than Deutsche would have it—Harvey insists that various forms of experience must be seen to cohere under a general structuring principle but nevertheless grants them somewhat diverse textures—there is no doubt that a fundamental crux has been reached. If, as Deutsche puts it, "issues currently being examined by feminists—relations of representation and difference," have been repressed from Harvey's brand of urban studies and social theory (or accounted for as secondary and therefore absorbed and neutralized within), then what kind of landscape are we able to envision within his (and similar) schemas?[6] And, practically speaking, just how do we think about the experience of a body in space when it is assumed to perform more or less like all other bodies?

While the discursive exchange I detail above is rooted in conversations around postmodernism as they continued to evolve in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the central

Fig. 1. Joan Jonas, *Vertical Roll,* 1972. Black-and-white video with sound, 19 minutes, 38 seconds

concerns—regarding the tension between sweeping theoretical premises and the individual subjects ostensibly accounted for in them—have hardly waned. Though the nomenclature *postmodernism* has retreated somewhat from contemporary discourse, concerns about increasingly dispersed attention, fragmented images, and heightened spectacle have not. But I bring up this episode not in order to speculate on whether postmodernist discourse has disappeared or simply taken on other guises but rather to think of the implications of Deutsche's argument for contemporary sculpture—both as it was understood to have evolved within the terrain of postmodernism and as it might yet be considered in regard to questions of "difference" today. For if it now seems increasingly difficult to say just what "sculpture" is—what it looks like, how it operates, where it begins and ends, whether it is anymore even a "medium"—one thing seems to persist as sculpture's purview and its promise: *spatiality,* shared between objects and viewers, if nebulously, tendentiously, uncertainly so. In what follows, I offer a characterization of sculpture as maintaining and enumerating vicissitudes of spatial disruption (and differentiation) and as continuing, in the best instances, to trouble fantasies of masterful vision.

Just a few years after the initial appearance of Deutsche's text, scholar Miwon Kwon would, in her important essay "One Place after Another: Notes on Site Specificity," trace a history of site-specific works that is especially pertinent for the present discussion—concluding as she does that those produced in "the wake of Minimalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s . . . forced a dramatic reversal of [the] modernist paradigm."[7] For a time, in Kwon's view, Postminimal and Conceptual practices—initiated by many of those artists Rosalind Krauss had singled out for her famous 1978 discussion of "the expanded field"—focused new, sustained attention to the ideological and material conditions of "site."[8] (This development itself would, Kwon argues, eventually cede again to more nomadic principles as institutional and social critique opted during the 1990s to redefine *site* more abstractly, in order to focus attention on race, class, and gender, and eventually on globalism, nationalism, and international policies.) Yet, while many of those earlier "site-specific" artworks (produced by the likes of Robert Smithson, Michael Heizer, Richard Serra, and so forth) do seem inextricably and primarily linked to the *places* in which they were conceived and presented, there is an important distinction to be made: they are not held "on-site" in a commemorative function; they exert some "presence," rather than function as markers of absence, as did premodernist sculpture-as-monument. And, importantly, since these works are not tied to any straightforward mediation between (past) event and (symbolic) meaning, they are able to unhinge the site per se from its physical location and subsequently offer it up as so many representations. Describing the example of Smithson's *Spiral Jetty* (1970) in this regard, Craig Owens writes, "Like the non-site, the *Jetty* is not a discrete work, but one link in a chain of signifiers which summon and refer to one another in a dizzying spiral. For where else does the *Jetty* exist except in the film which Smithson made, the narrative he published, the photographs which accompany that narrative, and the various maps, diagrams, drawings, etc. he made about it? Unintelligible at close range, the spiral form of the *Jetty* is completely intuitable only from a distance, and that distance is most often achieved by imposing a *text* between viewer and work."[9]

If one goes along with this reading, then these works executed in the "expanded field" of sculpture during the late 1960s and early 1970s can hardly be considered singular pieces, each one sutured cleanly to the site for which it is "specific." Rather, the newly expanded field allows for a production of works whose elements prismatically multiply and whose ostensibly central node (say, the *Jetty* proper) will rarely be seen by viewers *except* in the form of one kind of distancing

"text" (photograph, film, narrative, and so forth) or another. To frame these implications of textual mediation as a question: isn't it possible that, no longer arbitrating between actual site and representational sign (as did traditional sculpture), the expanded field shifted, rather than did away with, the go-between function, implicating the viewer directly into its triangulation? And, perhaps most important here, though the "distancing" effect that renders a site "completely intuitable" (to borrow Owens's phrase) might seem to underscore Harvey's logic with which I began, it, in fact, undoes any pretention to a holistic view even as such a perspective would seem rendered available. Indeed, if for Owens, the only way to access *Spiral Jetty* is to see it as operating as an endless "chain of signifiers," to find oneself in discursive exchange with its elements, then the work itself can only be understood as produced anew each time it is *read.* Is this one largely unexamined way in which the viewer (and, thus, the seeing-reading-speaking body) was, however subtly, interpolated into the scene of the site?[10]

It would seem so. For at the same moment that these artists were engaged in *site construction, marked sites,* and *axiomatic structures,* they (along with a number of their peers) were engaged in related experiments revolving around questions of "subjectivity."[11] The medium of choice for this other kind of work, seemingly so distinct from projects that displaced the skin of the earth or marked it with enormous constructions or burrowed below its surfaces, was video, and the subject, as it were, was most usually the self: how a person perceives and is perceived; how society imposes its rules upon the mind and upon the body; how an artist herself or himself could enact or parody artistic product (whether minimalistic, abstract, or expressionistic) using the body and raw technology as materials. Just *whose* body would act as material was another matter—in some cases, it was the artist's, but just as often, it was the audience member who simultaneously experienced the work while, in fact, *becoming a part of it*—and not always willingly.

To accommodate these alternative concerns among artists, we would do well to look back to an essay penned some two years prior to Krauss's "Sculpture in the Expanded Field." For, indeed, if we rely today too heavily (and perhaps with too much fidelity) on Krauss's essay on sculpture, reading another of her texts, seemingly unrelated, alongside it perhaps complicates its terms compellingly. In 1976 Krauss wrote another medium-defining essay, "Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism."[12] Here, she examines works that were produced between 1968 and 1973 and so were strikingly parallel in time to those discussed in relation to the "Expanded Field." In fact, many of the artists were even crossovers: Nancy Holt, Bruce Nauman, and Richard Serra appear in both essays. If, however, Krauss found in her assessment of new practices associated with sculpture a field that was expanded, her essay on video revealed a very different terrain: this one for the most part claustrophobic, "self-encapsulating," and dangerously inflected by the aesthetics of mass media. Indeed, on two separate occasions within the essay, she describes most video works as enacting the sense of "a collapsed present, that is, a present time which is completely severed from a sense of its own past."[13] As Krauss has it, a similar phenomenon occurs in the space of psychoanalysis—at least during that time when a patient is held in thrall of her or his own projected image, her or his own incessant (and unanswered) monologue (what Lacan refers to as the "monumental construct of narcissism").[14] And so, she writes, while the possibility for valuable works of video art exists, that potential is generally outweighed by that medium's proclivity toward (and in Krauss's view, its literal constitution as) reifying and magnifying narcissistic tendencies that were becoming more and more apparent in the culture at large in the mid-1970s.[15] (It is interesting to note that while for Krauss, Joan Jonas's 1972 *Vertical Roll* [fig. 1] was able to enact a

Fig. 2. Joan Jonas, *The Shape, The Scent, The Feel of Things*, 2005. Performed at Dia:Beacon, New York, October 2005–6. Multimedia installation, dimensions variable

productive disruption of video by "fouling the stability of the projected image," Lynda Benglis, in her 1973 *Now* [fig. 3], enacts a dangerous "spiral of infinite regress." In this regard one cannot help but fast-forward to recent work by Jonas, such as her multifaceted *The Shape, The Scent, The Feel of Things* [fig. 2] from 2006, which would seem able to both "foul the stability of the projected image" *and* enact "infinite regress.")[16]

To place the two modes in starker contrast: while in the 1976 essay, Krauss described the relatively new medium of *video* as inherently bankrupt, as necessarily producing an always-already collapsed present (not a field, really, but perhaps a discrete point, a kind of vacuum or black hole), she nonetheless in 1978 held out the possibility that certain *sculptural* practices might be able to sustain expansion, perhaps in a kind of historical tandem with the burgeoning *fleur du mal* that was "video art," but not really in conversation with it (or if a conversation, a heatedly repressed one—indeed, within the space of the two essays, a connection between sculpture and video is never broached at all). While artists like Nauman and Serra could be discussed in terms of video—they did, after all, both appear in her text on "narcissism"—they were ultimately excused from working within its grasp, since she saw them mainly utilizing that medium as yet another "text," (as secondary medium rather than primary) in the way Owens illustrates—as a way to expand, multiply, even fragment the "site," but never to collapse it.

Yet, while it might be argued that Krauss sought a complete distinction between the operations behind video and sculpture (she did not claim such a stance outright, but one can, I think, safely surmise as much by reading these two texts in light of each other), it seems important now to suggest an entanglement between them, and not simply owing to the artists that migrate between their pages. New considerations of subjectivity and the body were clearly in the air, and while it



Fig. 3. Lynda Benglis, *Now,* 1973. Color video with sound; 12 minutes

does seem necessary to separate Robert Smithson from, say, Lynda Benglis, and Carl Andre from Vito Acconci, it seems equally important to emphasize a certain shared terrain among them. If, for instance, one were to consider works produced in the "expanded field" as necessarily displaying a kind of *fragmented site*—one that extends and proliferates by way of texts, films, photographs, and writings—it is impossible not to speculate on the possibility for a similar kind of viewing subject, whose experience of virtually *any* artwork is necessarily in part virtual, phantasmic, and even self-generated. And to extend on such speculation, this kind of continual (re)production by art viewers would not, I think, have been surprising to artists like Smithson and Serra, whose works specifically appealed to the body's inability to take a work in all at once but, rather, to experience it as a series of part-objects that never really coalesces into an autonomous, finalized *thing.* Viewers of this kind would, by no means, be trapped in the "collapsed present" that Krauss describes in her text on video, yet viewers of both video and, say, earthworks, in 1972

might have been equally aware of the ways in which subjectivity itself was being called into question and the ways in which works of art were contingent—on sight as well as site.

Narcissism has been described by Sigmund Freud as a withdrawal of cathexis from its object and its turning back on the subject—a kind of constricted, isolated feedback loop, as Krauss describes it, pointing to the way that video's mechanism and its subject (the subject) seem mimetically linked. Since "self-encapsulation—the body or psyche as its own surround—is everywhere to be found" by Krauss within the early video work she discusses, we can speculate that any connection to "site" has, too, been internalized and phantasmically constructed as/by way of that body or psyche.[17]

For her part, Krauss predicted—correctly, it seems—that video, with its seductiveness heightened by its capacity to reflect and replay and its flirtations with modes of production linked to popular culture, gained in popularity, and not (for the most part anyway) owing to those few deconstructive capabilities the critic had pointed to as potentially redemptive. Representation of the "self" (through both video and a kind of cinematic photograph), as we know, rapidly became a predominant mode of art production throughout the eighties and after, and if narcissism had defined an early incarnation of this kind of work, *projection* perhaps best describes its later operation. Indeed, the historical trajectory of artistic production during the past few decades, thought through this lens, may then be seen in a very particular light.

In its later phase, one we are still in the throes of today, the internalized image of self began to be more overtly "projected" through the screen of culture, as it were, and was rendered more easily (and pleasurably) consumed by viewers. Artists produced works—video, film, photography but also appropriated images, performances, and environments—that, rather than mirroring purely interior psychic anxiety, reflected back the self's participation in, complicity with, and resistance to culture at large. Indeed, if there were any kind of "expansion" to be found between the narcissistic and projected stages of these representations of "self," it was one that accommodated a larger contextual reflection, one that allowed for the "scene" of culture to be cathected and brought into a larger cycle of (still mostly frustrated) desire and the "self" to be expunged from its radically reflexive state and then displaced and relocated into the external site of culture and capitalist production.

Mindfulness of this question of context prompts a consideration of the fate of both subjectivity and difference from another vantage: that of an expanded art world where a proliferation of seemingly diverse "viewpoints" obliterated distinctions even while invoking the rhetoric of difference. In 1982 Hal Foster addressed "The Problem of Pluralism"—the problem ironically being that in that moment of "pluralist, anything goes" art, there was really *no difference* to be found. As he succinctly put it, "Pluralism is precisely this state of others among others, and it leads not to a sharpened awareness of difference (social, sexual, artistic, etc.) but to a stagnant condition of indiscrimination—not to resistance but to retrenchment."[18] Moreover, as that author also points out, it seems that no style, medium, or position took precedence over any other and that a kind of apathetic "liberation" from history seemed the general state. "Modern art *engaged* historical forms, often to deconstruct them," Foster writes. "Our new art tends to *assume* historical forms—out of context and reified. Parodic or straight, these quotations plead for the importance, even the traditional status of the new art."[19] As Foster points out, this assumption of history is, at base, *ahistorical,* rendering what was once revolutionary equivalent to what is always already inconsequential. Indeed, within the logic of projection, this field of nondifferentiated images serves only as a screen within which the self can be (re)framed. If there is a "site" to which

the majority of this kind of work is tethered, that "site" might be seen as a kind of amorphous mass of images, culled from history but emptied of discrete meaning.

Lest these questions seem merely a matter of the past, consider the opening in 2007 of the much-anticipated *Unmonumental: The Object in the 21st Century*, at the New Museum of Contemporary Art in New York City. Legions of artists were included in the exhibition, which occupied the entirety of the museum's new building. Roberta Smith, asserting that this was a rare example of curatorial rigor and focus, claimed that the "show also vigorously reminds us of what a smart young artist once told me: Pluralism doesn't equal peaceful coexistence; it just means more sides to the argument." Later in the text, she added: "While visually messy, way too hip and a tad monotonous, the show is a gauntlet thrown down to other New York museums regarding contemporary art. It says: Get your nerve on. Take a stand. Start an argument by being focused or maybe even one-sided instead of just by being confused or simply too big or small."[20] It seems worthwhile here to call attention to a muddling of terms that precisely recalls what made so many individuals I have already mentioned—from Deutsche and Harvey to Krauss and Foster—so nervous, even if not for precisely the same reasons. A mix-up between pluralism and difference clearly persists—with "sides" taking precedence over the kind of dialogue that would introduce a contextual meaning for any "stand." Indeed, in a show that I found to be strangely homogenous (despite a number of excellent artists and artworks included there), there seemed to be rather than an argument a flattening of objects in space and, following, the ushering in of an omnipotent (if also impotent) viewpoint, one that would seem poised to take everything—if also nothing—in at a glance.

To this end, if there is, today, a reason to return to "expanded fields" and "narcissistic" media, it is, however, not to necessarily extol the virtues or limitations of either. If anything, this essay attempts to replot such recent theoretical premises and actual material practices in order to point to them as limit cases for our own moment. For if the "expanded field" has become so attenuated as to risk pure dispersal (or, perhaps such expansion has reached a state of *implosion*), narcissism, as Deutsche suggests, can no longer be seen as only a claustrophic, wholly interior conflation of subject and object (as Krauss would have it) but, instead, as an unexpected means of exchange (a kind of discursive *intercourse*). But, again, it is important not to simply reverse the terms or to see a swap in operations; here, I want to suggest a dialectical relationship between the expanded field and narcissism and claim the space between them as provocative terrain for a number of contemporary practices, all of which can be thought of as "sculptural" but which also seem to cast anew the "medium" of self-absorption. I am thinking here in particular of four artists, whose works call into question the purview of just how we think—and make—our relationships to objects in space: Rachel Harrison, who consistently disallows the notion of an innocent eye (or innocent I), with hybrid *things* that take up space and extract meaning from their viewers, rather than the other way around; Scott Lyall, whose strangely lyrical installations are literal reservoirs for cultural narratives that, nonetheless, give over information (*give it up,* with all the tawdry implications of that phrase intact), like coy lovers who demand courting; Tom Burr, whose slumping, slouching sculptures do more than ask modernism to assume a new pose—they, instead, are asked to take a newly passive position; and Pam Lins, who insists again and again on minimizing the lyricism of multisurfaced objects and on maximizing the anxiety (and pleasure) of every viewer who figures herself or himself in front of them.

That the descriptions above risk a kind of pathetic fallacy is purposeful. Indeed, while sculptural forms have long flirted with

Figs. 4–6. Pam Lins, *Owl,* 2009. Installed at Rachel Uffner Gallery, January 4–February 8, 2009. Acrylic, plaster, plywood, and panel, dimensions variable

Fig. 7. Rachel Harrison, *American Idol,* 2008. Wood, polystyrene, cement, Parex, acrylic, and microphone with stand, 62 x 24 x 89 in. (157 x 61 x 226 cm). Dimitris Daskalopoulos Collection, Greece

anthropomorphism (even, as Michael Fried tells us, when those forms are cubes, a far cry from figurative), the ramifications of this are too little remarked upon, perhaps because they are, in a sense, so very obvious: if we find ourselves identifying too closely with objects, they become reflective surfaces, so many mirrors. Perhaps such an otherwise unappealing (or at the very least uncouth to most) proposition describes well the crux in and by which the artists I name above operate: at the crossroads between narcissism and expanded field. If Lins, for instance, throws up, in an installation such as her recent *Owl* (figs. 4–6), so many sculptural decoys, she labors, however, not for the kind of repetition one might associate with the "one thing after another" logic of Judd et al. Rather, there is a kind of crowd mentality at work in Lins's constructions, by which I mean that we, as viewers, *scan* the surfaces of objects that are familiar but not placeable, simulating a feeling uncannily akin to entering a room full of people whose names you simply cannot remember but with whom you now must chat. This struggle for meaning—around and by way of objects—is operative, too, in Harrison's work (see fig. 7), which is all too often explained by way of consumerism and Neo-Pop appropriation. More to the point, I think, than identifying the mass-produced items (products and people) assembled in her pieces, is the way, as a viewer, one is suddenly

Fig. 8. Tom Burr, installation view of *Addict-Love,* SculptureCenter, New York, January 13–March 30, 2008

all too aware of feeling stranded, ill-at-ease around objects that feel if not mean-spirited, certainly ungenerous, unwilling—surprisingly, given their welcoming guises—to meet you halfway. For all the stuff assembled in Harrison's works, they are strangely stark, even stingy, holding tight to themselves all that they have managed to accumulate. Burr and Lyall, if very differently, disrupt the smooth mechanics of any recourse to formalism and, even more, to objective viewing. Indeed, in exhibitions such as the former's *Addict-Love* (fig. 8) and the latter's *The Color Ball* (fig. 9), every shape, every reference, every line of sight is infused with hypertrophied desire—and thus, the objects *glance* back: as the etymology of that word suggests, both delivering a blow *and* rendering the whole situation *slippery, unstable.*

If mine is an all too cursory mention of these artists for whom an entire essay apiece is more appropriate, I mean, nonetheless, to gesture speculatively at the historical terrain and present conditions in which they work. Indeed, at a moment when the word "pluralism" is yet again wielded as a compliment, it seems all the more imperative—urgent even—to consider the politics of and possibilities for *difference.* The turn back to a kind of zeal for "anything goes" in the aesthetic realm is nothing more than a thinly veiled return to the idea of a coherent—rather than contingent—viewer. (The conservatism of such zeal becomes clear in turn, since the social context, and subtle links between subjectivity and society, are discouraged or discarded as matters for conversation.) In art by Harrison, Lyall, Burr, and Lins, any such

Fig. 9. Scott Lyall, installation view of *The Color Ball,* The Power Plant, Toronto, September 20–November 23, 2008

fiction is dispelled. We are recalled, in front of their works, to what Elizabeth Grosz calls the "Imaginary Body": that site where "psychosexual signification" is inextricably linked to the "lived reality of sexed bodies" (and here, it is of utmost importance to add that bodies are constituted as well by race, class, and other conditions).[21] We are prompted, in other words, to enact the very opposite of omnipotent sight: We watch ourselves seeing—newly and acutely aware of our predispositions and projections toward the images and objects of art—even while knowing that such an act is, by definition, fleeting, delusory, phantasmatic.

Indeed, we might even be aware of our attempting to approximate the impossible. For while previous generations of artists like Serra and Smithson moved into the "expanded field" to produce artwork that never settled into fixed objects—and so introduced among viewers a profound awareness of contingency—artists today must navigate a cultural field that is immediately accommodating of such enterprise. In other words, the context for art making now already offers some pale semblance of the expanded field, able to—or, more accurately, wanting to—embrace diverse iterations of art, in order to offer the impression of plentiful variety (which will satisfy any institutional desire for new, if not self-reflexive, experience). The artist is thus placed in an utterly paradoxical position: to borrow Roberta Smith's language regarding museum institutions, taking a "stand" here might be, in fact, to play into preexisting models for making art, never unsettling or

interrogating them but rather reinforcing them; to behave differently might only be, in fact, to behave more or less like all other bodies. The omnipresent view is both flexible and subtle.

And so the dilemma facing the contemporary artist is one of engaging such a context even while standing apart—or, more precisely, of finding a way to meaningfully stand apart in an artistic context that asks all artists to stand apart. (How does one trouble a masterful vision that is asking for trouble?) The task of the sculptor more specifically then becomes particularly complex, since the introduction of true difference in her or his work—always-already inserted into the expanded fold, almost despite itself—would require an idiosyncratic relationship with spatiality. And this is where, perhaps, it is narcissism that—understood as I have argued it here as a kind of inappropriate but productive overinvestment in the self—works to *limit* any field, to circumscribe it, to insist, that is, on the dumb stubbornness of a simple truth: you never look at me from the place from which I see you.

1. Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1981), 103; emphasis in the original.

2. Rosalyn Deutsche, "Boys Town," in Deutsche, *Evictions: Art and Spatial Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), 202–44.

3. Deutsche is responding in particular to Harvey's book on postmodernism: David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). She also discusses another of his texts, published about the same time: David Harvey, *The Urban Experience* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

4. Deutsche, "Boys Town," 209; emphasis mine.

5. Ibid., 214. As Deutsche points out, Harvey borrows the concept of the voyeur in terms of spatial relations from Michel de Certeau's *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) but changes its connotation; as Deutsche puts it, de Certeau used the notion of voyeurism to point to and critique the illusion of visual mastery, whereas Harvey makes of this fantasy something to be regarded as powerful and even real. Deutsche's reference to Laura Mulvey is to that writer's famous 1975 feminist analysis, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," in *Visual and Other Pleasures* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 14–27.

6. Deutsche, "Boys Town," 209.

7. Miwon Kwon, "One Place after Another: Notes on Site Specificity," *October* 80 (spring 1997): 85–110. See also Kwon's later book, *One Place after Another: Site-Specific Art and Locational Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002). While Rosalyn Deutsche's essay most famously appears in Deutsche, *Evictions,* it was first published in the journal *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 9 (1991): 5–30; a related piece, also reproduced in *Evictions,* titled "Expertease: Rosalyn Deutsche on Men in Space," first appeared in *Artforum* 28, no. 6 (February 1990), 21–23.

8. Rosalind Krauss's enumeration of postmodernist sculpture appears in her germinal "Sculpture in the Expanded Field," in Krauss, *The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), 276–90.

9. Craig Owens, "Earthwords," *October* 10 (fall 1979): 128.

10. Of course, the body had been directly implicated into the arena of the art object well before this moment, most famously in relation to Minimalist sculpture. In his widely known 1967 exposition, "Art and Objecthood," Michael Fried names most Minimal works "theatrical" or "literalist," because, for him, the viewer comes to occupy central status, dangerously displacing the art object by privileging the bodily "situation" in relationship to an object over the object itself. Fried's plea is to restore ideals of modernist autonomy and dispense with the "corruption" of theatricality that threatens to "literalize" art. While I tend to disagree with Fried's assessment of Minimal sculpture (as bad art), I think his inherent worry about an onslaught of "literalism" is prescient and continues to inform my own thinking about the relationship between art objects and viewers. See Michael Fried, "Art and Objecthood," in *Art and Objecthood* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

11. Krauss's three complex axes as derived from her Klein diagram of sculpture in "Sculpture in the Expanded Field."

12. Rosalind Krauss, "Video: The Aesthetics of Narcissism," *October* 1 (spring 1976): 50–64.

13. Ibid., 53.

14. Ibid., 57.

15. According to Krauss, there are three ways to utilize video productively, these all largely as *against itself*: (1) by internally critiquing the medium of video; (2) by representing a physical assault on video in order to break its psychological hold; or (3) by using video as a "sub-species of painting or sculpture."

16. Krauss, "Video," 55, 60.

17. Ibid., 53.

18. Hal Foster, "The Problem of Pluralism," *Art in America* (January 1982); revised and published (tellingly) as "Against Pluralism," in *Recodings: Art, Spectacle, Cultural Politics* (New York: New Press, 1985), 13–32.

19. Foster, "Against Pluralism," 16. In 1968 Roland Barthes, although in an altogether different context—that of Bunraku—coined the term "the reign of quotation." This would seem to be the primary mode of postmodern production. See Barthes's "Lesson in Writing," in *Image Music Text* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 177.

20. Roberta Smith, "In Galleries, a Nervy Opening Volley," *New York Times,* November 30, 2007.

21. Elizabeth Grosz, "Psychoanalysis and the Imaginary Body," in *Feminist Subjects, Multimedia, Cultural Methodologies,* ed. Penny Florence and Dee Reynolds (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1995), 183–96; partially reprinted in Sandra Kemp and Judith Squires, eds., *Feminisms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 299.